TypeScript SDK for Luxor Sandbox: cloud sandboxes (microVMs) for AI agents on Luxor Agent Cloud
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TypeScript SDK for Luxor Sandbox, programmatic cloud sandboxes for AI agents on Luxor Agent Cloud.
npm install @luxorai/sandbox
Requires Node.js 18 or newer. Bun 1.3 or newer also works.
This package was published as
@tenkicloud/sandbox. That name keeps working and publishes the same code at the same version, andTenkiSandboxremains an alias ofLuxorSandbox.
Pass { streamOnly: true } to session.run(argv, options) to receive stdout and stderr chunks without retaining them in the final result.
Consume both readable streams while the command runs.
Streaming-only mode bounds each unread output queue and pauses the producer when that queue is full until its reader frees capacity.
Waiting without consuming stdout and stderr can block completion.
Cancel an unused readable stream with proc.stdout.cancel() or proc.stderr.cancel(), or pass an AbortSignal to abandon the run.
Awaiting the handle still returns exit status, timing, and disk metadata, with empty stdout and stderr.
The default remains output collection, including session.exec(...).
Call session.release() after finishing active commands to stop credential renewal and free this handle's local data-plane connection while the sandbox keeps running.
Release is idempotent and prevents await using disposal from terminating the sandbox.
The released handle cannot start new data-plane operations; use client.get(session.id) to obtain another handle.
An explicit session.close() still terminates the sandbox after release.
Release does not close the shared SDK client.
import { LuxorSandbox } from "@luxorai/sandbox";
const sandbox = new LuxorSandbox(); // reads LUXOR_AUTH_TOKEN
// create() waits by default via a single server-held request and returns a
// run-ready sandbox with data-plane access primed.
const session = await sandbox.create({
cpuCores: 2,
memoryMb: 4096,
});
try {
const result = await session.run(["echo", "hello"]);
console.log(result.exitCode); // 0
} finally {
await session.close();
}
Session also implements AsyncDisposable, so await using works in runtimes that support explicit resource management.
Use TailnetAuthKey so string, JSON, and Node debug formatting redact the credential.
waitForOnline keeps the session in creation until Luxor verifies the registered node.
import { LuxorSandbox, TailnetAuthKey } from "@luxorai/sandbox";
const session = await new LuxorSandbox().create({
tailnet: {
authKey: new TailnetAuthKey(process.env.TAILNET_AUTH_KEY!),
tags: ["tag:sandbox"],
exposePorts: [3000],
acceptRoutes: true,
waitForOnline: true,
},
});
console.log(session.tailnetStatus?.state, session.tailnetStatus?.fqdn);
The direct key is write-only and never appears on Session.
The server may reject options from later milestones, including wake-on-connect and recreate-on-resume.
Pass an API key or service token starting with lx_ (tk_ is still accepted) explicitly, or set LUXOR_AUTH_TOKEN or LUXOR_API_KEY (TENKI_AUTH_TOKEN and TENKI_API_KEY are still read when no LUXOR_* token is set). Every LUXOR_* variable takes precedence over its TENKI_* equivalent:
const sandbox = new LuxorSandbox({ authToken: "lx_..." });
apiKey is an alias for authToken. If both are supplied, authToken wins.
Set baseUrl, LUXOR_API_ENDPOINT or LUXOR_API_URL to point the client at another API host such as https://api.luxor.ai;
TENKI_API_ENDPOINT and TENKI_API_URL are still read when no LUXOR_* URL is set.
Blank or whitespace-only values count as absent.
LUXOR_API_KEY is only used when it starts with lx_ or tk_; any other value is ignored.
The credential determines the Workspace automatically; ordinary Sandbox calls do not require a Workspace ID.
Version 0.7.0 removes the generated workspace settings and pause-retention RPCs.
Use getUsage() for read-only workspace usage and limit data. Its shared
concurrency entry now uses the max_concurrent_jobs key.
Version 0.6.0 removes ClientOptions.cookieName and support for Ory session
tokens and browser cookie values. Pass an lx_ API key or service token through
authToken; the SDK sends it as an Authorization: Bearer credential.
const session = await sandbox.create({
name: "my-sandbox",
cpuCores: 4,
memoryMb: 8192,
diskSizeGb: 10,
allowInbound: true,
allowOutbound: true,
env: { NODE_ENV: "production" },
metadata: { purpose: "ci" },
tags: ["ci"],
cloneRepoUrl: "https://github.com/org/repo",
githubToken: process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN,
sticky: true,
});
await session.refresh();
await session.extend(10 * 60 * 1000);
await session.update({ name: "renamed", tags: ["ci", "kept"] });
await session.pause();
await session.resume();
await session.close();
idleTimeoutMinutes is deprecated and ignored: sandboxes do not auto-pause on
idle. Use maxDurationMs, or session.pause() to pause explicitly.
sticky: true discards maxDurationMs and runs the session until it is
terminated. Manual pause and resume do not clear sticky. The returned
session.warnings array retains the structured warning. By default,
LuxorSandbox writes each warning to console.warn. Set warningHandler to
route warnings through your logger, or pass null to suppress emission:
const sandbox = new LuxorSandbox({
warningHandler: (warning) => process.emitWarning(warning.message),
});
const session = await sandbox.create({ sticky: true, maxDurationMs: 60 * 60 * 1000 });
if (session.warnings[0]?.code === "STICKY_OVERRIDES_MAX_DURATION") {
console.log("maxDurationMs was discarded");
}
Create from an image or snapshot:
await sandbox.create({ image: "workspace/name:tag" });
await sandbox.create({ snapshotId: "snap_..." });
pause() resolves once the session is PAUSED: the memory checkpoint is on the host and the RBD rootfs image is finalized.
Ceph and R2 replication continue in the background after it resolves.
It rejects with the rollback reason if a verified rollback restores RUNNING.
pauseAsync() returns after the service durably accepts the request and moves the session to PAUSING on a node that supports asynchronous pause.
Acceptance does not mean the VM has stopped, so call waitPaused() before resuming or relying on the checkpoint.
waitPaused() resolves at PAUSED and throws PauseFailedError if a verified rollback restores RUNNING.
Pass 0 as timeoutMs to wait until an abort signal cancels the call.
A LOCAL_READY pause snapshot resumes on the host that captured it.
DURABLE_CEPH snapshots can resume on a capability-matched host in the same datacenter while R2 replication continues.
DURABLE snapshots are portable to eligible hosts.
resume() resolves once the session is RUNNING, so the next call can use it right away.
It throws ResumeFailedError with the restore error if the session falls back to PAUSED.
If the call's deadline passes first, it throws ResumeWaitTimeoutError; the resume may still land, so call waitResumed() to keep waiting.
Calling resume() on a session that is already RESUMING joins that resume instead of failing.
resumeAsync() returns once the service accepts the resume, usually with the session in RESUMING.
Call waitResumed() before running commands.
It resolves at RUNNING, throws ResumeFailedError if the resume fails, and throws ResumeWaitTimeoutError after the timeout.
await session.resumeAsync();
await session.waitResumed();
Pause captures the VM's full memory, not only its disk: a resumed session is the same running machine, not a reboot. Processes keep their PIDs and their in-memory state, and the guest clock stops for the duration of the pause.
/tmp is cleared across a pause. Keep durable state under /home/tenki, which
is preserved.
The kernel boot ID (/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id) changes on every resume,
so it can't tell a resume from a restart. Memory-backed paths such as /dev/shm
survive a pause but not a restart, so a token written there can.
While a session is paused it serves no traffic: preview requests return 404
until it resumes. The client connection itself is not dropped — a held
keep-alive connection returns 200 again after resume — so treat a paused
session as unavailable rather than disconnected.
SSH is different: a held transport fails on use while paused and does not
recover after resume, so reconnect rather than retry on it. A fresh
connection succeeds as soon as the session is RUNNING again.
async function text(cmd: string): Promise<string> {
const result = await session.exec(["bash", "-lc", cmd]);
return new TextDecoder().decode(result.stdout).trim();
}
await text("echo hello > ~/marker");
await text("setsid nohup sleep 3600 >/dev/null 2>&1 </dev/null &");
const pid = await text("pgrep -n sleep");
await session.pause();
await session.resume();
console.log(await text("cat ~/marker")); // "hello" - the marker file survived
console.log(await text(`kill -0 ${pid} && echo alive`)); // "alive" - same process, same memory
const proc = session.run(["npm", "test"], { cwd: "app", env: { CI: "true" } });
const reader = proc.stdout.getReader();
try {
for (;;) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) break;
process.stdout.write(value);
}
} finally {
reader.releaseLock();
}
const result = await proc;
console.log(result.exitCode);
exec takes argv either as a command plus options.args or as a single array:
await session.exec("sh", { args: ["-c", "echo hi"] });
await session.exec(["sh", "-c", "echo hi"]); // equivalent
For simple commands, you can await run directly:
const result = await session.run(["echo", "hello"]);
console.log(new TextDecoder().decode(result.stdout));
Process cwd values follow the guest contract: relative paths are normalized
under the sandbox guest workdir (/home/tenki by default), absolute paths are
used unchanged, and missing or non-directory targets fail before the process
starts.
cwd sets the spawned process's directory. A login shell (bash -lc) sources
the guest's startup files first, so a cd in ~/.bashrc or ~/.profile runs
before your command and wins over cwd; use bash -c when the directory must
hold.
Commands are unbounded by default. Pass timeoutMs for a budget, or a signal
to cancel.
The budget is enforced by the guest-agent, which signals the process on expiry
(SIGTERM, escalating to SIGKILL) and reports the run as timed out. That is
not an exception — it resolves with status: "TIMED_OUT", carrying the output
captured before the budget expired:
const result = await session.exec("bash", { args: ["-lc", "npm ci"], timeoutMs: 120_000 });
if (result.status === "TIMED_OUT") {
// result.reason is "timeout", or "grace_timeout" when the guest could not reap
// the process. Partial output usually shows where it stalled.
console.error(result.reason, new TextDecoder().decode(result.stdout));
}
Aborting is an exception — the call rejects with the signal's reason:
const controller = new AbortController();
const pending = session.exec("bash", { args: ["-lc", "make build"], signal: controller.signal });
controller.abort();
The guest caps the request at its own configured maximum command timeout, and
older guest-agents accept timeoutMs but ignore it, leaving the run unbounded.
A command returns when its stdout and stderr reach EOF, not when the shell exits. A backgrounded process inherits both streams and holds them open, so this waits for the server rather than the shell:
// Hangs: the server inherits stdout/stderr.
await session.exec("sh", { args: ["-lc", "python3 -m http.server 3000 &"] });
Redirect both streams to detach it:
await session.exec("sh", { args: ["-lc", "python3 -m http.server 3000 >/home/tenki/http.log 2>&1 &"] });
Redirecting only stdout is not enough — stderr still holds the stream open — and
nohup does not help, because it blocks SIGHUP rather than stream inheritance.
This is standard POSIX behavior, the same as Node's own child_process.exec.
To keep hold of a service instead, use session.run() and read from the handle
rather than awaiting it; for services you always want running, start them from a
template startCmd instead.
That last option is the durable one. Every exec child runs inside the
guest-agent's own systemd cgroup, so a guest-agent restart kills it, and nohup
does not change that. Pause and resume restore VM memory, so a backgrounded
process does survive a pause with the same PID — which makes an ad-hoc service
look more durable than it is. Anything load-bearing belongs in a template start
command with a readiness probe.
signal() and kill() enqueue a signal frame and resolve immediately — they do
not wait for the process to die, matching Node's child_process.kill().
Awaiting the handle is what resolves once the process has actually exited:
const proc = session.run(["sleep", "3600"]);
await proc.signal("SIGTERM"); // resolves once the frame is queued
const result = await proc; // resolves once the process has exited
console.log(result.signal); // "terminated"
result.signal carries the guest's own name for the signal, not the name you
passed: SIGTERM reports "terminated" and SIGKILL reports "killed". Compare
against those values, not against "TERM"/"KILL".
Signalling before the guest acknowledges the spawn is safe: the SDK may still be retrying the stream open, and a signal queued during that window is replayed onto the replacement stream rather than being dropped.
kill() takes no argument and always sends SIGKILL; use signal(name) for
anything else. Only KILL, TERM, INT, HUP, USR1 and USR2 are
supported (with or without the SIG prefix), and any unrecognized name is
silently sent as SIGTERM — a typo like signal("SIGTRM") stops the process
gracefully instead of throwing, and so does signal("unspecified"), which is a
harmless no-op in the Python SDK. (Python raises ValueError for unknown names
instead.) Signalling a process that has already exited is a no-op, not an error,
so the result of signal()/kill() is best-effort by design.
Process lifetime is bound to the Run stream, not to the handle. Once that stream tears down — the connection breaks, or the edge times the idle connection out (~30s) — the platform sends SIGTERM, escalates to SIGKILL after 5s if the process is still alive, and reaps it within 10s.
Dropping the handle does not close the stream on its own: the outbound queue is closed only once the result settles. An abandoned process can keep running, and one that keeps writing output keeps its own stream alive indefinitely. To stop a process, signal it and await the handle rather than abandoning it. There is no reattach — a caller that loses the handle must respawn.
Simple helpers:
await session.writeFile("/tmp/config.json", '{"key":"value"}');
const data = await session.readFile("/tmp/config.json");
console.log(new TextDecoder().decode(data));
Filesystem API:
await session.fs.mkdir("/tmp/example");
await session.fs.stat("/tmp/example");
const entries = await session.fs.list("/tmp");
await session.fs.remove("/tmp/example");
The root disk defaults to 5 GiB and holds the base image as well as your work, so a fresh
sandbox already reports around 56% used. It is fixed at create time and cannot be grown in
place — pass diskSizeGb (5–100) to create if you need more. Budget for it before a
large install.
Every ExecResult carries disk. isDiskExhausted(result.disk) reports whether the
sandbox ran out of space at any point during the command — check it even when the command
exited 0, since npm reports ENOSPC as a warning and still exits successfully with a
broken install.
allowInbound and allowOutbound both default to true, so a session reaches the internet and can expose
ports without passing either option. They are create-time settings and cannot be changed on an existing
session; session.inboundEnabled / session.outboundEnabled report what a session was created with.
Restrict outbound access with allowDomains and allowCidrs. A session that may only reach PyPI:
const session = await client.create({
allowDomains: ["pypi.org", "*.pypi.org", "files.pythonhosted.org"],
});
allowOutbound: false still blocks everything, regardless of allowDomains/allowCidrs.
The allowlist is checked against the names the sandbox resolves, the TLS server name (SNI), and the plaintext HTTP Host.
*.example.com matches one subdomain label and **.example.com matches subdomains at any depth; neither matches example.com itself.
Connections can only reach addresses that an allowed name resolved to or that fall in an allowed CIDR; traffic to an allowed CIDR is not inspected unless the sandbox uses outbound secret injection.
UDP port 443 (HTTP/3, QUIC) is blocked for sandboxes with a domain allowlist, so clients fall back to HTTPS over TCP.
Unless the sandbox uses outbound secret injection, HTTPS is not decrypted, so another site on the same CDN as an allowed name can be reached by sending its name in the encrypted Host header.
Without HTTPS interception, other ports remain open to addresses an allowed name resolves to.
Read the allowlist back from session.egress.
With interceptHttps: true, the egress proxy terminates the session's HTTPS with a managed CA the guest trusts, and a request whose Host differs from the TLS server name gets 421.
It requires allowDomains.
The httpRules then decide which requests pass: each HTTP request must match one rule's domains, methods and path, or it gets 403 egress_http_rule_denied.
Domains use the allowlist grammar plus *, empty methods match any method, and the path is exact, a prefix, or an RE2 regex that must match the whole escaped path (the query is not matched).
Without rules, every request to an allowed domain passes.
Read-only access to package registries, plus git clone (but not git push) from GitHub:
const session = await client.create({
allowDomains: ["github.com", "codeload.github.com", "pypi.org", "files.pythonhosted.org"],
interceptHttps: true,
httpRules: [
{ domains: ["github.com", "codeload.github.com", "pypi.org", "files.pythonhosted.org"], methods: ["GET", "HEAD"] },
{ domains: ["github.com"], methods: ["POST"], pathRegex: "^/[^/]+/[^/]+(\\.git)?/git-upload-pack$" },
],
});
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